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ABSTRACT 
The notification of the level of domestic support to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is intended to 
reflect compliance with obligations entered into at the time of the Uruguay Round. WTO members have 
often been slow to provide notification of domestic support levels. This makes the process of notification 
less useful as an indicator of the degree to which changes in policy have or have not benefited the trade 
system as a whole and exporting countries in particular. The notification of domestic support in the E.U. 
illustrates the value of a measure that reflects current policies and can therefore act as a basis for 
negotiation of further disciplines where these are necessary. 
The E.U. has made major changes in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the period 
since 1992 when the MacSharry reforms were implemented. Payments originally notified in the blue box 
(related to supply control) have over time been changed until in their present form they are unrelated to 
current production or price levels, and hence can satisfy the criteria for the green box. The E.U. has 
therefore much more latitude in trade talks to agree to reductions in the allowable trade-distorting support.  
This paper reproduced the E.U. notifications relating to 2003/04 and extends these with official 
statistics to the year 2006/07. It then projects forward the components of domestic support until the year 
2013/14, based on forecasts of future production and estimates of policy parameters. The impact of a 
successful Doha Round is simulated, showing that the constraints envisaged in the WTO draft modalities 
document of May 19, 2008, would be binding by the year 2013, at about the time the next budget cycle in 
the E.U. starts. Without the Doha Round constraints, further reform might still happen for domestic 
reasons, but the framework provided by the WTO for domestic policy spending would be less relevant. In 
that case, much could hinge on the legitimacy of the Single Farm Payment system under the current rules 
governing the green box.   
Keywords: agricultural support, CAP, WTO Doha Round, notification of domestic support, WTO 
compliance 
    1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The notifications of the level of domestic support made by the E.U. (and other countries) to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) are intended to monitor domestic farm policy changes. They measure the 
amount of assistance given by governments to the agricultural sector relative to a country’s international 
commitments. Particular emphasis is placed on the extent to which policy changes have reduced the 
amount of support given by instruments that are most likely to distort trade. Notifications of domestic 
support are not intended to reflect the total impact of policies on other countries, nor are they designed to 
give an indication of the economic costs of farm policies. They monitor compliance with rules that were 
introduced in a particular context to provide some disciplines for certain types of policy that were deemed 
to be particularly disruptive of trade.
1
                                                       
1 Further discussion on the interpretation of the WTO’s domestic support measures is included in the Introduction to the 
Conference. 
 Other parallel disciplines applied to tariffs (elimination of nontariff 
barriers and binding tariff levels) and export subsidies (binding and reducing both expenditures and 
quantities of exports benefiting). The domestic support notifications are therefore only one component of 
a full evaluation of the impact of policy changes on trade patterns, but they are valuable as a measure of 
the extent to which such changes have moved countries along the path toward policies that have less 
impact on other countries. 
The E.U. has in recent years expanded its membership to 27 countries, substantially reformed its 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and been the respondent in several challenges in the WTO that 
involve agricultural products. Current trade negotiations would, if concluded, add further constraints on 
the CAP. E.U. officials maintain that the reforms of the CAP have significantly reduced its impact on 
world markets. Both trade negotiations as well as trade litigation have hinged on the relationship between 
the E.U.’s domestic support commitments and their actual level of support. The calculation of shadow 
WTO notifications of domestic support, in advance of the official notifications, is thus of considerable 
interest to other countries as well as of relevance to policy choices at home. Moreover, it is useful to 
know what is the likely trend in such notifications in the future. Negotiations of further constraints in the 
WTO can be facilitated by informed, if informal, estimates of policy direction.  
The changes in both the composition of the E.U. and the nature of the farm policies provide a 
challenge for anyone attempting to anticipate future notifications, as major policy changes are introduced 
over time and unevenly across the E.U. membership. The apparent precision in allocating support to the 
various “boxes” defined in the Agreement on Agriculture dissipates when faced with staggered 
implementation of policies by 27 member states. This adds importance to the careful calculation of the 
level of support under various headings, but also introduces an element of uncertainty. The shadow 
notifications and their projection into the future described below must be interpreted with this caution in 
mind.  
   2 
2.  DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE E.U. 
The level of farm support in the E.U. has historically been high relative to that of many other countries. 
The high level of that support has been criticized by trading partners, as has the nature of the support 
measures used. The CAP was introduced 45 years ago, when agriculture in the original six member states 
was still recovering from the devastation of the Second World War. Countries agreed on the need to offer 
secure markets within the E.U. through protection against imports and the purchase of surplus products 
for disposal abroad. Import protection was given by means of a levy that varied inversely with world 
prices (a variable levy) so that imports would enter the domestic market at a predetermined threshold 
price. On the export side, a subsidy (restitution) was paid that covered the difference between domestic 
intervention prices (at which supplies were purchased off the domestic market) and the world price.
2 Thus 
domestic prices were supported at a level that reflected a political decision by the (agricultural) Council of 
Ministers meeting periodically.
3
A succession of reforms in the past 20 years has changed the nature of the CAP and the policy 
environment in which E.U. agriculture exists. In 1992 a significant change was agreed to that introduced 
direct payments in compensation for price cuts in cereals and beef, and the support arrangements for 
oilseeds were revised. These cereal and oilseed payments, based on area grown, represented the first 
major change in the instrumentalities used by the E.U. to support its farm sector since the 1960s.
   
With such a controlled market, the need for internal subsidies was minimal.  Domestic (taxpayer-
funded) subsidies were the exception rather than the rule, being limited to products of mainly regional 
importance such as durum wheat and olive oil, to livestock grants paid to hill farmers, and to the crushers 
of E.U.-grown oilseeds. (The oilseeds subsidy was a contentious scheme that provoked a trade dispute 
with the United States.)  
4
Domestic subsidies were also constrained in the URAA, in particular those that were deemed to 
be most trade distorting. The extent to which these direct payments, related to past output and tied to 
quantitative restraints, should be disciplined was a major topic for negotiation at the Blair House meeting 
of November 1992, at which the E.U. and the United States agreed on the main parameters of the URAA. 
The device of the blue box was introduced at that time as a way of placing the MacSharry compensation 
payments (and the U.S. deficiency payments) in a category separate from the most trade-distorting 
subsidies (as measured in the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), often loosely called the amber 
box.)
  The 
reforms reduced the reliance on intervention and the subsequent subsidizing of exports in the cereals 
market by cutting the domestic support price. The reduction of cereal prices and the consequent decline in 
the need for export subsidies allowed the E.U. to agree to restrictions on export subsidies in the GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Uruguay Round, as embedded in the Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA) and the related country schedules.  
5
                                                       
2 Both the threshold price and the intervention price were linked to a target price that was intended to give an acceptable 
level of farm income. The system described here operated for cereals: Other crops and livestock products had regimes of a 
broadly similar nature.   
3 Though there is technically only one Council of Ministers, the composition of the council varies with the subject matter 
under discussion.  
4 The MacSharry reforms also increased, and extended, the range of headage payments for beef farmers, and brought those 
for sheep and goats into a comparable framework. 
5 As Brink (2006) has pointed out, the term amber box is used inconsistently by commentators, sometimes including and 
sometimes excluding the de minimis amounts that are not counted in the current total AMS. This paper will avoid the use of the 
term amber box to avoid adding to the confusion.  
 The blue box payments were not subject to reductions, though they had to be limited (for crops, to 
a fixed area and yield, or paid on 85 percent or less of a base level of production), and support was not to 
exceed the 1992 levels. Thus the blue box became the way in which the reformed CAP became consistent 
with the Uruguay Round constraints. The notifications by the E.U. to the WTO reflect this compromise.   3 
3.  NOTIFICATIONS OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT, 1995/96–2006/07 
The first notification of domestic support by the E.U., in 1995/96, coincided with the final years of the 
implementation of the MacSharry reforms.
6 Direct payments (the area payments on cereals and oilseeds, 
and the headage payments on beef and sheep) were placed in the blue box, as they were associated with 
limits on production. As a result, the original notifications, from the 1995/96 marketing year, included a 
large AMS component (48 billion euros)
7 and smaller but sizable blue box (21 billion euros) and green 
box (19 billion euros) payments.
8
Total domestic support, including AMS, blue box, and green box (and de minimis amounts 
“used”) has declined somewhat from around 90 billion euros in the period after the Uruguay Round to 
around 70 billion in the past two years.
  
The E.U. last notified its level of domestic support in December 2006. The period covered 
support up to the 2003/04 marketing year. Table 1 shows the notifications from 1995/96 to 2003/04, 
together with the “shadow” notifications calculated as described below for the three years since the last 
notification. The nine notifications from 1995/96 to 2003/04 show a marked reduction in price supports 
compensated by an increase in direct payments. Current total AMS payments fell from around 48 billion 
euros in 1995/96 to 31 billion euros in 2003/04, a 35 percent decline. Blue box payments rose over the 
period, from 21 billion to 25 billion euros, and green box payments rose from 19 billion to 22 billion 
euros, suggesting that about 7 billion euros in less trade-distorting support has replaced 17 billion euros of 
more trade-disruptive payments. Table 1 also shows that the shadow notification estimates for the current 
total AMS are about 26 billion euros in 2006/07, continuing the trend. The blue box estimated notification 
for the more recent years shows a sharp decline (discussed more fully below) to less than 4 billion euros. 
Anticipated notification of the green box suggests that this could have risen to nearly 37 billion euros as a 
result of recent policy developments.  
9
Tables 2–4 show some more detail of the E.U.’s domestic support notifications, extended to bring 
them up to date. The AMS (Table 2) includes three main categories of support: direct payments that do 
not fall under the green or blue boxes (nonexempt direct payments); market price support for products for 
which an administered price exists; and an equivalent measure of support (EMS) for those products where 
the domestic market is supported but where no obvious administered price exists.
 The share of the green box in that total support has increased 
from 21 percent to 54 percent over the period. The trends in the various categories of support are clear 
from Figure 1, which also indicates the share of notified support falling in the various categories. The 
switch from blue box to green box has been accelerating in recent years.  
10 These three 
components make up the product-specific AMS from which an allowance of up to 5 percent of the value 
of production (de minimis) is deducted. Non-product-specific AMS relates to subsidies that are not 
confined to one commodity: the E.U. notifies a relatively small amount of such general farm support, and 
this has always been less than the 5 percent of total value of production allowed as a de minimis 
amount.
11
The blue box categories are shown in Table 3. The E.U. notifies the payments that go to crop and 
livestock producers under schemes where eligibility is limited by hectarage of crops or by headage of 
 The current total AMS is the sum of these components. 
                                                       
6 The compensation payments were introduced progressively in the marketing years 1993/94–1995/96. 
7 The relevant notification went through a number of revisions and corrections. (G/AG/N/EEC/12 Rev. 1 of September 1999 
gave the current AMS as 50.0 billion euros). 
8 No estimate exists of what would have been the AMS notifications before 1995, had they been required. But it is likely 
that, in the eight years between the 1986–1988 base and 1994/95, trade-distorting support (as measured by the AMS) fell from 
about 80 billion to 50 billion euros. The MacSharry payments cushioned this by means of the 20 billion euro compensation 
payments placed in the blue box. Green-box-eligible policies probably rose modestly over the same period. 
9 The total domestic support calculated here is not to be confused with the overall trade-distorting support, a measure under 
discussion in the Doha Round. 
10 Producer levies are also included as negative subsidies, as has been the case for sugar (B levies) in the E.U. The 
equivalent measure of support is mainly used for fruits and vegetables, where support is given on a periodic basis. 
11 The two items identified as constituting the non-product-specific AMS are insurance subsidies and interest rate 
concessions.    4 
livestock. Thus the major items are the crop and oilseed payments based on land under cultivation at the 
time of the MacSharry reforms. Premia for beef production make up a large proportion of the livestock 
blue box payments, again reflecting the MacSharry reform process. The reduction in the blue box 
payments at the end of the period shown in the table indicates the likely notification of the new Single 
Farm Payments system in the green box. 
The green box category itself (Table 4) contains a mix of programs, ostensibly not triggered by 
price or output. Over time the most significant components of the green box have been investment aids 
and general services (including program administration). Environmental and regional aids have been 
expanding recently, reflecting changing emphases in farm spending. However, the most significant 
change in the green box has been the emergence of “decoupled income support” as a major category of 
spending (see below).
12
The nature of the CAP reforms since 1995 is clearly reflected in the notifications of domestic 
support to the WTO. The “old” CAP did not rely heavily on domestic subsidies: Support was mainly 
through high internal support prices maintained by import levies and export subsidies.
  
13
The mix of policies in the E.U. changed relatively little from 1995 to 2000, as the reforms in the 
cereal and oilseed sectors were being assimilated. But budget pressures and the prospect of 10 new 
members from eastern and central Europe led the E.U. to consider further reforms. These were 
incorporated in a decision known as the Agenda 2000 reforms that were agreed in 1999. These reforms 
had a noticeable impact on the E.U. domestic support notifications, maintaining the direction of the 1992 
reforms but pushing somewhat further. Intervention prices were reduced by 29 percent for cereals 
(including a more substantial cut for rice) and, from 2005, they were to be reduced by 15 percent for 
butter and for skim milk powder, reducing the gap between these “administered” prices and the fixed 
reference prices.
 Support prices 
have been reduced for most of the major products, to close somewhat the gap between E.U. prices and 
those in world markets. Export subsidies have also been reduced in part as a result of the WTO 
constraints. The “new” CAP, building on the MacSharry reforms, relies heavily on direct payments to 
farmers based on past production patterns and is broadly unrelated to current prices and output decisions.  
In contrast to the situation in the United States, the level of world prices has had rather little 
influence on the notified level of domestic support. The base period for the URAA commitments (1986–
1988) was a time of low world prices. The low prices were reflected in the level of reference prices that 
were used to calculate AMS and EMS levels for products with administered prices. As a consequence, 
base period domestic support payments were relatively high. By 1995, the first year of implementation of 
the URAA, the situation on world markets had changed. One might have expected a significant drop in 
support levels. But the high world prices were not fully reflected in the E.U.’s notifications because of the 
WTO-mandated use of a fixed external reference price when computing levels of support. When world 
prices dropped in 1998, and stayed low for 3 years, AMS levels in the E.U. also fell. The calculation of 
the AMS (and EMS) from world prices of 20 years ago illustrates the weakness of these measures as a 
meaningful reflection of the actual level of support given by administered prices. 
14
Even more significant in their impact on the E.U.’s domestic support notification have been the 
reforms enacted since that time, notably the 2003 Fischler reforms, the changes in the regime for the 
 The AMS fell from 48 billion euros in 1999/2000 to 28 billion euros in 2002/03. 
Changes in the beef regime also modified the notifications somewhat: To the existing subsidies for 
suckler cows and the special beef premium were added a slaughter premium and some supplementary 
payments, notified as blue box payments, as they were limited to base levels of livestock numbers. Blue 
box payments increased by 5 billion euros over this period. 
                                                       
12 In contrast to the United States, in the E.U. domestic food aid is a small fraction of green box spending. 
13 Domestic support notifications are only indirectly influenced by changes in tariffs and in export subsidies. The level of 
tariffs and the expenditure on export subsidies are not discussed in detail in this paper, though they are of course equally relevant 
in the assessment of changes in the external implications of E.U. policy toward farm products. 
14 The Agenda 2000 package also agreed on a new dairy premium from 2005, to compensate dairy farmers for the scheduled 
reductions in butter and skim milk powder intervention prices. In G/AG/N/EEC/17 the E.U. said it intended declaring these 
payments in the blue box.   5 
Mediterranean crops in 2004, the reform of the sugar policy in 2005, and the reform of the fresh and 
processed fruit and vegetable policies in 2007. A change in the wine policy is under discussion, and the 
impact of the likely reform is reflected in our projected notifications for the years beyond 2009. The 
introduction of a Single Farm Payment, the key ingredient of the 2003 reform (see below), further 
separates payments from current production. The 2004/05 notification of domestic support will include 
some of these decoupled payments under the Fischler reforms, those that were made in 2004, but the main 
impact will be on the notifications from 2005/06 to 2009/10, by which time most of the policy changes 
should have been implemented.  
The nature of the direct payments has also undergone changes with the relaxation of 
commitments to continue the production of specific products. The Agenda 2000 reforms consolidated 
payments for cereals and oilseeds, and the Single Farm Payment system incorporates subsidies for most 
other producers in the same scheme. This again will be reflected in notifications: Many blue box 
payments become eligible for the green box as they no longer are linked to production.  The shadow 
notifications reported in this paper document this shift.  6 
Table 1. Summary of E.U. domestic support notifications, 1995/96 – 2006/07, million euro 
  Notifications  Shadow Notifications 
   1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99  1999/2000  2000/01  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07 
   € billion 
Green box  18.7  22.1  18.2  19.2  19.9  21.8  20.7  20.4  22.1  22.1  32.5  36.6 
Blue box  20.8  21.5  20.4  20.5  19.8  22.2  23.7  24.7  24.8  24.3  11.0  3.6 
Current total AMS  47.5  51.0  50.2  46.7  47.9  43.7  39.3  28.5  30.9  32.9  29.0  25.8 
                          
PS de minimis "used"  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.9  0.9 
NPS de minimis "used"  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.9  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.0 
                          
Total support  87.9  95.4  89.3  86.7  87.9  88.3  84.2  74.6  78.8  81.2  74.4  67.9 
                          
Share of total support                         
Green box  21.3%  23.2%  20.3%  22.1%  22.7%  24.8%  24.5%  27.4%  28.0%  27.2%  43.7%  53.9% 
Blue box  23.7%  22.6%  22.9%  23.6%  22.5%  25.2%  28.2%  33.2%  31.5%  29.9%  14.8%  5.3% 
Current total AMS  54.1%  53.5%  56.2%  53.8%  54.5%  49.5%  46.6%  38.2%  39.2%  40.6%  39.0%  38.0% 
De minimis  0.9%  0.8%  0.5%  0.4%  0.3%  0.6%  0.7%  1.3%  1.3%  2.3%  2.5%  2.8% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
                          
URAA AMS binding  78.7  76.4  74.1  71.8  69.5  67.2  67.2  67.2  67.2  67.2  67.2  67.2 
Share of binding  60.4%  66.8%  67.8%  65.1%  68.9%  65.0%  58.5%  42.4%  46.0%  49.1%  43.2%  38.5% 
Note: PS de minimis refers to the allowable product-specific support up to 5% of the value of output of that product: NPS de minimis refers to the allowable non-product-specific 
support up to 5% of the value of agricultural output. Not all the de minimis allowances are “used”.  
 
Table 2. Composition of E.U. AMS notification and shadow notification 
  Notifications  Shadow Notifications 
  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99  1999/2000  2000/01  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07 
  million euro 
 Non-exempt direct payments   2,409   2,263   2,210   2,088   2,391   3,062   3,395   4,064   3,848   3,823  3,823  3,823  
 Market price support and EMS   44,307   48,521   47,775   44,405   45,347   40,262  35,694  24,084   26,283   30,347  26,402  23,224  
 Sum of PS AMS   46,716   50,783   49,985   46,492   47,738   43,323  39,089  28,147   30,131   34,170  30,225  27,047  
 Sum of non-de minimis PS AMS   47,526   51,010   50,194   46,683   47,886   43,654  39,281  28,490   30,880   32,944  29,000  25,823  
 NPS AMS   777   728      486   348   291   538   574   938   1,052   995  995  995  
 Non-de minimus NPS AMS   -  -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -  -  -    -    
 Current Total AMS   47,526   51,010   50,194   46,683   47,886   43,654  39,281  28,490   30,880   32,944  29,000  25,823  
                         
 Total AMS limit   78,670   76,370   74,070   71,760   69,460   67,160  67,160  67,160   67,160   67,160  67,160  67,160  
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Table 3. Composition of E.U. blue box notifications and shadow notifications 
  Notifications  Shadow Notifications 
  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99  1999/2000  2000/01  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04 2004/05 2005/06  2006/07 
Payments- fixed area and yields                       
Maize payments      973   1,223   1,213    1,182   1,159   1,486   1,614   1,580   1,198    1,222   559   115  
Other cereals 
8,639  
      
10,001    9,555    9,372    8,842   10,019    10,718   10,184   10,802    9,795   4,481    920  
Oilseeds payments  2,381    2,439    2,369     2,264   1,318    1,984    1,846   1,200    1,361    1,388   635   130  
Pulses payments     523       525      618     647      524     450    515    474    507     70   65    59  
Flaxseeds payments       72         97       129     166      307     113     91    54    70      71    33    7  
Set-aside compensation  2,112   1,828    1,251    1,272    1,848   1,527   1,893   1,616   1,843    1,879   860   176  
Durum supplements     948    1,081    1,016    993    1,006   1,074   1,242   912   1,113    1,109    505    148  
Voluntary set-aside payments              38   58    70        
Silage payments                59    75    74    110    71     33     7  
Rice payments         41      81      124   113    113   118      200    92   19  
Total crop payments 
15,648  
      
17,193   16,191    15,978    15,128   16,825   18,144   16,268   17,074   15,805   7,262   1,580  
Livestock payments - fixed number of head                       
Suckler cow premium   
2,446    2,043   1,695    1,669     1,628    1,777   1,959   2,226   2,092   2,228    1,315   1,234  
Special beef and veal premium   1,407    1,239   1,341    1,297    1,299   1,530   1,748   1,946   1,929   2,122    684    98  
Slaughter premium             494   1,025   1,719   1,727    1,783    637   360  
Beef supplemental payments             148    295   484   489    486   152    1  
Deseasonalization premium       23      40      45     24    3                
Ewe and goat premium  1,321    1,007     1,171   1,536    1,734   1,449     554   2,085   1,471   1,837    951    343  
Total livestock payments  5,197   4,328   4,252    4,526    4,664   5,398   5,582   8,459   7,708   8,456   3,739   2,036  
TOTAL BLUE (notified) 
      
20,846  
      
21,521  
      
20,443    20,504    19,792         22,223  
      
23,726  
      
24,727  
      
24,782  
      
24,262  
      
11,001   3,617  
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Table 4. Composition of E.U. green box notifications and shadow notifications 
  Notifications  Shadow Notifications 
  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98  1998/99  1999/2000  2000/01  2001/02  2002/03  2003/04  2004/05  2005/06  2006/07 
  € billion 
General services    5.0     6.5       5.5      5.0       6.7       4.7     5.6     5.2     5.0     5.0     5.0      5.0  
Public stockholding     -          -          -       0.0      0.0        0.0     0.0     0.0    0.1    0.1     0.1       0.1  
Domestic food aid    0.3     0.4       0.3      0.3      0.3       0.3     0.2    0.3    0.3     0.3     0.3       0.3  
Decoupled income support  0.2     0.2      0.2     0.1      1.0       0.5     0.2      0.0    0.0        -      10.5     14.5  
Income insurance     -         -          -          -           -          0.0     0.0     0.0    0.0     0.0     0.0       0.0  
Disaster relief    0.3     0.4      0.3      0.2      0.4        0.4     0.4      0.8     0.7     0.7     0.7      0.7  
Producer retirement     0.2       1.0      0.6      0.7      0.8      0.7     0.8      0.8     0.8     0.8      0.8      0.8  
Resource retirement    1.0       1.5     0.3      0.4     0.1      0.5     0.1      0.1     0.1     0.1     0.1      0.1  
Investment aids    6.6      5.0     4.9      5.4      2.3     5.9     5.4     5.3    6.8     6.8     6.8    6.8  
Environmental payments     2.8      4.2     3.7      5.0     5.5     5.7     5.5     5.0     5.2     5.2     5.2    5.2  
Regional assistance    2.3      3.0     2.3      2.0     2.9     3.2    2.4     2.8    3.0     3.0    3.0     3.0  
Total green box    18.7     22.1    18.2    19.2    19.9     21.9    20.7    20.4    22.1     22.1    32.5     36.6  
 
 
Figure 1. Notifications of domestic support, E.U., 1995/96 to 2003/04, with shadow notifications to 2006/07 
 
           








































Source: WTO Notifications and authors’ calculations  
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4.  CONSISTENCY WITH WTO LIMITS 
In the URAA, limits were put on trade-distorting domestic support. In particular, the current total AMS 
had to be within a ceiling given by the 1986–88 base level reduced over six years by 20 percent. The base 
period AMS, as calculated by the E.U. (and agreed by other countries), was to be reduced by the year 
2000 to 67.2 billion euros. The E.U. (at that time the EU12) declared a base period AMS of 73.53 billion 
euros, which with a 20 percent reduction would have given an AMS commitment in 2000 equal to 58.82 
billion euros. However, a “credit” of 2.38 billion was negotiated, and this led to a final bound AMS of 
61.20 billion euros being agreed to (see Supporting Table 9a in the E.U. notification). Enlargement to the 
EU15 necessitated some changes. The initial AMS figure of 78.7 billion euros mentioned in the text was 
the EU15 limit in the first year of implementation. The revised final bound AMS was fixed at 67.2 billion 
euros for the EU15. These commitments continue until a revised set of limits is agreed on, as would be 
the case if the Doha Round arrived at a conclusion. 
Has the E.U. been within the limits set by the Agreement on Agriculture? In part because of the 
high AMS recorded in the base period and in part as a result of the steady progress of reform, moving 
away from price support toward direct payments, the E.U. has had no difficulty staying within its 
constraints. Figure 2 shows the current total AMS in relation to the negotiated AMS limit. In the latest 
official notification, the AMS stood at 30.9 billion euros, and our shadow notification for the current year 
shows the level at 25.8 billion euros. Projected notifications as discussed below indicate that one could 
expect the level of AMS payments to drop by about another 2 billion euros with the full impact of the 
CAP reform, and to be stable after 2009. The situation gives the E.U. considerable scope for reductions as 
part of a Doha Round agreement. The implications of such an agreement are considered in a later section.  
Figure 2. E.U. notifications of aggregate measure of support (current total AMS) and limit agreed 
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5.  IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON E.U. NOTIFICATIONS 
The impact of enlargement, from 15 countries when the first notification was made in 1995/96 to 27 
countries at present, poses some unique questions for the calculation of shadow notifications. The 
previous enlargement was in 1995, when 3 new members (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) joined the E.U. 
As they were already members during the 1995/96 marketing year, the first notification by the E.U. 
included all 15 member states. The latest notification is for the EU25, as indicated in a footnote in the 
E.U.’s submission to the WTO, even though enlargement took place in the middle of the 2003/04 
marketing year.  
The addition of the production from the 12 new members that joined in 2004 and 2006 increases 
the AMS (and EMS). This is a side effect of the way in which the AMS is calculated, as production levels 
of products listed as benefiting from the existence of an administered price would be added in to those of 
the EU15. The gap between the administered price and the reference price, used for calculating the AMS 
and EMS, would be multiplied by a larger amount of “eligible production.” Our calculations show that the 
extra production could inflate the AMS and EMS total for all relevant products by 3.7 billion euros (see 
Table 5). To this can be added the extra green and blue box payments in favor of the new members, 
though budget allocations for most of these programs were “stretched” over more farmers without any 
increase in funds.   
Table 5. Effect of E.U. enlargement on notified AMS (billion euros) 
Notification year  EU15  EU27 
2004/05  29.7  30.2 
2006/07  18.3  20.9 
2008/09  17.0  21.9 
2010/11  16.2  19.7 
2012/13  16.2  19.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
In addition to the increase in the notified AMS from the new members, another consequence of 
enlargement is of potential significance. This involves the nature of the aggregation of the WTO limits. 
Most of the 12 new members that have joined the E.U. since 1995 have themselves notified support under 
the URAA.
15
A successful Doha Round that reduced the AMS limit to, say, 30 percent of its current level 
would potentially restrict the E.U. in its policy decisions (Blandford and Josling, 2007). Under these 
conditions, one might assume that the additional AMS from new members could be added to the E.U.’s 
ceiling. But as the AMS from the new 12 members would also be cut by up to 70 percent, the addition to 
the AMS ceiling might only be 0.45 billion euros, raising the total AMS commitment for the EU27  to 
 It would seem likely that the E.U. will be able to add the AMS limits of the new members to 
the existing limit of 67.2 billion euros. This could add 5.8 billion euros to the AMS ceiling. Butault and 
Bureau (2006) estimate that these countries had expenditures in 2001 of about 1.5 billion euros, adding 
significantly to the flexibility of the E.U. in meeting any more stringent obligations that might come from 
an agreement in the Doha Round. If there is no conclusion to the round, it seems unlikely that other 
countries will find it worthwhile to examine and challenge the change in the WTO AMS commitment of 
the E.U. Even if the new members brought none of their preexisting AMS ceilings with them, E.U. 
current total AMS is still likely to be well below the ceiling agreed for the EU15.  
                                                       
15 The 10 new members that joined the E.U. in May 2004 were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia. Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007. Of these 12 new members, 4 countries 
(Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, and Romania) have bound AMS ceilings at zero (Butault and Bureau, 2006). Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic have significant AMS ceilings. Hungary is expected to be able to modify its own AMS ceiling to account for 
inflation before that amount is added to the E.U. limit.     11 
10.5 billion euros.
16
Table 6. Enlargement impacts on notifications 
 This increased ceiling would be more than offset by the additional AMS that would 
have been notified as a result using EU27 levels of production. To that extent, the impact of enlargement 
could be to tighten the restrictiveness of the URAA constraints. The conclusion of a Doha Round might 
be expected to exacerbate this effect.  
The implications of the enlargement of the E.U. from 15 to 27 members are summarized in Table 
6. 
Issue  Notification of 2003/04 
Domestic Support 
(G/AG/N/EEC/53) 
Policy Change  Implications for 
Notifications 
Enlargement of 
E.U. to EU25 
and then to 
EU27 
On page 18 of 
G/AG/N/EEC/53, the 
following footnote appears: 
“This notification covers 
support to the European 
Union after enlargement on 
1 May 2004. Price gap 
calculations are performed 
on EU25 production levels 
for a 12-month period and 
include direct payments to 
25 member states.” 
It is not clear why the E.U. 
chose to make an EU25 
declaration for 2003/04, 
given that accession took 
place on May 1, 2004. 
A separate footnote declares 
that the AMS commitment 
of 67.2 billion euros is 
“without prejudice to the 
EC25 commitment to be 
presented in the new EC25 
schedule after 
enlargement.” 
Ten new member states 
were added from May 
2004, plus two more from 
January 2007The 2004/05 
notification will cover the 
EU25.  
New members have some 
flexibility in the way they 
implement the CAP 
regimes. In addition, they 
have agreed transitional 
arrangements for direct 
payments. A simplified 
SAPS will apply. 
However, Malta and 
Slovenia opted to apply 
the IACS system in 2004, 
2005, and 2006, and shift 
to the SPS regional model 
from 2007. 
The SAPS will be notified in 
the green box in the 2004/05 
declaration. 
Increased production 
(eligible quantities) will 
show up in current total AMS 
calculations for 2006/07 to 
account for Bulgaria and 
Romania. 
Blue box payments for Malta 
and Slovenia will need to be 
added in the 2004/05, 
2005/06, and 2006/07 
declarations. 
There may be some specific 
payments for new members. 
Note:  IACS is the Integrated Administration and Control System, SPS is the Single Farm Payment Scheme and, SAPS is the 
Single Area Payment Scheme. These different ways of administering the direct payments are described in the text. 
                                                       
16 If the aggregation of the base period AMS for the EU15 and the 12 new members is treated as being the base for the 
EU27, then the reduction under Falconer’s draft would be 70 percent of the total. If the AMS cuts for each new member were to 
be based on its own AMS in the base period, the reduction could be less, as the new members would not fall in the highest tier of 
domestic support cuts.    12 
6.  REPLICATION OF RECENT NOTIFICATIONS 
The most recent notification from the E.U. relates to the 2003/04 marketing year. Any attempt to extend 
the notifications to 2006/07 and beyond needs to be based on an understanding of the elements that went 
into the official notification. Two separate aspects of this replication are important. The first is to ensure 
that the calculations internal to the notification are replicable. In most cases this is simply a matter of 
arithmetic, applying price gaps to eligible quantities and calculating de minimis exemptions, for instance. 
The second aspect of replication is to locate the sources of data from which the elements in the 
notification tables were likely to have been derived.  
The format of the notifications is given in the URAA and its implementing documents. The E.U. 
(along with all countries notifying domestic support) submits a table showing the current total AMS and 
the agreed AMS limit, together with several supporting tables giving details of the subcategories of the 
AMS. The structure of these tables is shown in Table 7, below. 
The supporting tables for 2003/04 include some specifics of the council regulations that authorize 
the policies, but only a general reference to data sources. In the case of the green box tables, this reference 
is to “EAGGF financial reporting 2004 and national sources.”
17
Production data in the E.U.’s latest WTO submission (G/AG/N/EEC/53) was checked against 
other published sources, in particular the online version of Agriculture in the European Union - Statistical 
and Economic Information 2006 (accessed at 
 The former is readily available, but the 
latter is difficult to replicate without considerable additional data. Direct payments notified in the blue 
box are from “EAGGF financial reporting 2004” and hence publicly available. Production values are also 
from easily available sources, in this case from Eurostat. No data source is recorded for the notification of 
the product-specific EMS (similar to the product-specific AMS but relating to fruits and vegetables, wine 
and cotton) or for the non-product-specific AMS. This poses difficulties for the replication of the 2003/04 
notification as well as for the calculation of the shadow notifications for more recent years. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agrista/2006/table_en/index.htm). In Sheet DS: 5, the 2003 production data 
in G/AG/N/EEC/53 matched the EU25 2003 production reported in Agriculture in the European Union 
for the main cereals, rice, white sugar (“usable production,” excluding C sugar), and olive oil. Data for 
oats and minor cereals were reported differently, and total cereals production in G/AG/N/EEC/53 
appeared to be 2 percent less than in Agriculture in the European Union. Butter was 5 percent more, and 
skim milk powder 4 percent less. For beef, 2003 data for EU25 were not available in Agriculture in the 
European Union. 
Among other difficulties encountered in the replication were the different time periods and 
aggregation levels used by the published E.U. budget documents and those behind the notifications data.
18
                                                       
17 EAGGF is the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the part of the E.U. budget that funds the major 
agricultural programs. 
18 The use of budget data as a way to derive the shadow notifications is discussed in Appendix B. 
 
This made the process of replication less precise than it might be. But we were able to replicate the 
2003/04 notification to a reasonable degree of accuracy.   13 
Table 7. Tables used in notifying domestic support 
Table  Contents  Sources 
DS:1  Current total AMS and total AMS 
commitment level 




Measures exempt from reduction 
commitments: green box 




Measures exempt from reduction 
commitments – direct payments under 
production-limiting programs: blue box 
EAGGF financial reports 
Supporting Table 
DS:4 
Calculation of current total AMS  Supporting Tables DS:5 to DS:9; 




Product-specific AMS – market price 
support 
E.U. legislation for prices; 
commission estimates of eligible 




Product-specific AMS – nonexempt direct 
payments 
E.U. legislation for prices; 
commission estimates of eligible 
production; EAGGF and national 
sources for fees and levies 
Supporting Table 
DS:7 
Product-specific AMS – other product-
specific AMS (and total product-specific 
AMS) 
Supporting Tables DS:5 and DS:6 
Supporting Table 
DS:8 
Product-specific EMS  E.U. legislation for prices; 
commission estimates of eligible 
production; EAGGF and national 




Non-product-specific AMS  No data source shown in 
notifications 
Source: E.U. notifications WTO, 2007) 
a  No source is given in notifications for price and production levels needed to calculate EMS: It is assumed to be similar to 
those used to calculate market price support.   14 
7.  SHADOW NOTIFICATIONS TO 2006/07 
In a perfect world one might expect countries to notify up-to-date domestic support levels, perhaps even 
with preliminary figures for years where the data is not yet fully available.
19
                                                       
19 Natural lags in data collection will always imply some delay in definitive notifications. But for domestic use, agencies that 
publish data regularly provide preliminary estimates under such circumstances. 
 In the imperfect world of 
hesitancy about providing estimates that might prove to be useful to other countries, notifications are 
often delayed and produced only when strategic considerations allow. As a consequence, much of the 
contemporary value of the notifications is lost. The calculation of careful shadow notifications when 
governments are tardy can help in promoting transparency and better policy decisions.  
Armed with the knowledge of the arithmetic and data sources used to compute the 2003/04 
notifications, the extension of these notifications for an extra three years is possible. Figure 1, above, 
shows graphically the results of this attempt; the notification totals are shown in Table 1. We expect the 
notification for 2004/05 to be similar to that for the latest notification, with a small increase in the AMS 
to 32.9 billion euros. The changes in policy agreed to in 2003 will, however, produce a major shift in the 
notification for 2005/06, as the Single Farm Payment system begins to show up. A significant shift away 
from the blue box of about 13 billion euros is likely to be notified in 2005/06, and a further shift of 7 
billion euros could be notified the next year. A reduction in the calculated AMS also reflects the changes 
in policy, as some payments that were previously linked to output are shifted to the green box. The green 
box itself could be notified as high as 36.6 billion euros in 2006/07, an increase of almost 15 billion euros 
over the 2003/04 notification. By 2006/07 the transformation of the CAP will be well under way, with a 
further increase in decoupled direct payments and a reduction of those in the blue box and the product-
specific AMS expected in the years up to 2013.  
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8.  THE NOTIFICATION OF DIRECT PAYMENTS 
Notification of direct payments, and in particular the Single Farm Payment, is the most critical element of 
the E.U.’s domestic support notification. However, this notification can cause some problems in the future 
if the E.U. is asked to account explicitly for its calculations. The difficulty arises from the fact that 
remnants of the previous direct payments system (stemming from the MacSharry reforms) coexist with 
the newer payments from the Fischler reforms. The former are still in the blue box, and the latter are 
presumably headed for the green box. So part of a direct payment may be fully decoupled and part may 
not be, leading to the question of how the E.U. will notify the expenditure. We have assumed that the 
expenditure can be split between the blue and green boxes, allocating only that amount paid without 
reference to production or price to be in the green box. But this requires other countries to go along with 
the notion that payments can be split up in this way. Without the ability to split the notification of certain 
subsidies, the E.U. would presumably have to notify all direct payments under the blue box whenever the 
degree of decoupling was less than 100 percent. That would make any restrictions on the size of payments 
under the blue box, such as those being discussed in the Doha Round, much more restrictive. 
Moreover, countries still have flexibility in the way they operate the direct payments system. The 
problem stems primarily from the fact that the implementation of the new policy instruments is largely in 
the hands of the member states. For example, France has retained 25 percent of its national ceiling for 
arable crops (the total direct payments allowable) to pay as coupled aid—in order to avoid the 
abandonment of farmland. This is in accord with the flexibility given to members in the 2003 reform. In 
2005 France’s total IACS payments (i.e., those monitored by the integrated administration and control 
system) on arable crops was 5,198 million euros.
20
Another assumption we have made is that all SPS payments are equally eligible for inclusion in 
the green box. This again is a necessary simplification. Table 8, below, shows the main way in which 
countries have chosen one of the three methods by which to pay direct decoupled payments. The SPS can 
either be based on historical yields of the farm concerned or on the average yields of a region. 
Alternatively, the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) allows countries in the first few years after 
accession to pay on a uniform basis for all agricultural land qualifying for such payments. In all cases, the 
national ceiling for such payments is agreed upon at the E.U. level.
 So an amount equal to 1,299.5 million euros was spent 
by France on coupled support in that year. This latter figure should presumably appear in the blue box in 
the appropriate notification, and the rest of France’s direct payments on arable cropland will appear in the 
green box. But it remains to be seen whether the E.U. will choose to make 27 such calculations and to 
amalgamate them into the E.U. notification. 
In the shadow notifications reported here, we have allowed for the notification of direct payments 
to be split between blue and green boxes. The allocation is to a certain extent arbitrary, as there is no 
convenient way to aggregate up to the E.U. level the actual implementation decisions taken by the 27 
members. But the E.U. regulations themselves generally define a limit to the amount of coupled aid that 
can remain. So the allocation between blue and green boxes in our shadow notifications is based initially 
on these maximum amounts but assumes also that over time these coupled payments are replaced by 
decoupled payments as they are incorporated fully into the Single Payment Scheme (SPS).  
21
                                                       
20 See details at 
 We make the assumption that the 
method of calculating the payments per farm is not relevant to the notification of the payment, so long as 
it is not tied to current production or to price.  
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/fin/index_en.htm 
21 Some countries have indicated that they will adopt a historic basis in some regions and a regional basis in others. 
Moreover, there may be changes over time away from a historic toward a regional basis for payments.    16 
Table 8. Implementation of SPS in different member states  
SPS Historical  SPS Regional  SAPS 
Austria  Denmark  Cyprus 
Belgium  Luxembourg  Lithuania 
France  Sweden  Estonia 
Greece  Finland  Latvia 
Ireland  Germany  Slovakia 
Italy  UK (Northern Ireland and England)   Czech Republic 
Netherlands  Malta (from 1/1/07)  Hungary 
Portugal  Slovenia (from 1/1/07)  Poland 
Spain     
UK (Scotland and Wales)       17 
9.  PROJECTIONS OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT NOTIFICATIONS, 2007/08–2013/14 
For many purposes it is useful to supplement the shadow notifications that bring such notifications “up to 
date” by projecting these measures of policy conformity into the future. Such projections require that one 
make assumptions about policy decisions several years into the future. In the case of the E.U., this 
involves speculating as to how fast and far the present trend toward decoupled payments and away from 
price-based support will continue. In addition, one has to make assumptions about the membership of the 
E.U. in the future, and about its budget decisions. Production levels for the market price support 
component of the AMS (and EMS) also need to be projected.
22
On the issue of enlargement, three countries are in the “batter’s box,” awaiting the call to the 
plate. Croatia and Macedonia could conceivably join in a few years if they are deemed to have adequate 
internal infrastructure to administer the E.U. policies and are deemed strong enough to participate in the 
single market.
  
With respect to policy assumptions, one can expect a reasonably predictable trajectory in the CAP 
for the next few years. Discussions of policy change are already under way in the context of the next 
financial perspective, to be agreed by 2013. The Health Check recently initiated by the E.U. Commission 
(EU Commission, 2007) suggests a further movement toward decoupling in the interim. If this is agreed 
by the E.U. ministers, then the projections will gain a degree of certainty. The projections that are shown 
in Figure 1 and Table 1 indicate a continued growth in green box notifications as more member countries 
move to the payment of fully decoupled payments. The assumption has been made that policy 
developments do not involve a departure from current trends.  
23
The Falconer proposals, as they would apply to the E.U., are summarized in Table 9.
 Adjustments to the AMS limit and the support levels of the E.U. would be small as a 
result of the accession of these two countries. Of much more potential significance is the possibility of 
Turkish membership. Turkey is a large country with a substantial agricultural sector. The adjustments to 
the WTO notification of domestic support would be of significance, but there would undoubtedly have to 
be some significant policy adaptations and a possibly lengthy transition period. Given the political 
sensitivity of Turkish membership, we have chosen to make the assumption that it will not happen in the 
period up to 2013.  
The Doha Round is at present considering a number of changes to the URAA that would have an 
impact on the constraints on E.U. policy from WTO obligations. In May 2008 Ambassador Crawford 
Falconer, the chair of the WTO’s Committee on Agriculture, released a revised set of draft modalities for 
agriculture that included detailed proposals for future disciplines on domestic support (WTO, 2008). The 
Falconer Revised Draft Modalities paper was an attempt to frame the parameters of such increased 
restraint so countries could converge on a single document. The E.U. has indicated that it would be 
willing to accept a conclusion within the range of the Falconer draft, provided that other countries 
respond with satisfactory offers in other areas. 
24
                                                       
22 Although macroeconomic conditions are also relevant to the policy environment, as indicated earlier the use of fixed 
reference prices effectively insulates the AMS from these factors. 
23 Other parts of the former Yugoslavia are less likely to be considered for accession within the six-year time frame used 
here. 
24 For more detail on the impact of the DDA Revised Draft Modalities on the levels of allowable EU domestic support, as 
well as on market access and export competition, see Jean, Josling and Laborde (2008).  
 of that 
document. The proposals would place a limit on overall trade-distorting support (OTDS). The base period 
OTDS would comprise the final bound total AMS, 10 percent of the 1995–2000 value of agricultural 
production (the current de minimis allowances), and the higher of the average blue box payments and 5 
percent of the value of agricultural production in the base period. This OTDS limit would be subject to 
reductions over the implementation period of the agreement. There would also be reductions in the limits 
for the total AMS from the final values applying under the Uruguay Round Agreement as well as in the 
de minimis percentages. The blue box would have limits imposed based on the percentage of the value of   18 
production. Limits would also be imposed on the product-specific AMS and on product-specific blue box 
support, as described in the table.  
The implications for the E.U. of these proposals are summarized in Tables 10 and 11. The base 
OTDS, from which reductions would be measured, would be 110.3 billion euros. Thus the range for the 
final bound OTDS would be from 16.5 billion to 27.6 billion euros. This corresponds to an estimate of 24 
billion euros for the current total OTDS in the year 2013/14.
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Table 9. Main domestic support provisions of the Revised Draft Modalities (May 2008) as applied 
to the E.U. (squared brackets indicate alternatives).  
 Thus the more restrictive limit would 
appear to bind and impose further policy changes of a nature consistent with developments since 2003. 
The AMS limit would be reduced from the current level of 67.2 billion euros to 20.1 billion euros 
(augmented minimally by allowance for the enlargement of the E.U.). The estimated current total AMS 
for the year 2013/14 is 24.1 billion euros, indicating significant restraint on E.U. policies by the year 
2013/14. The overall picture is shown in Figure 3. The year 2013/14 is also the start of a new budgetary 
cycle in the E.U., at which time the funding for the CAP could well be trimmed for internal reasons. 
Item  Initial Values  Reduction 
Overall trade-distorting 
domestic support (OTDS) 
Base OTDS = final bound total AMS + 
10% of the value of production in the 
base period (1995–2000) + average 
blue box payments in base period
a 
Base level reduction of [75] [85] 
percent. Initial reduction of 1/3 in first 
year: remaining reductions in five equal 
steps 
Total aggregate measure of 
support (AMS) 
Base level is final bound total AMS 
(from Uruguay Round schedules) 
Base level reduction of 70 percent. 
Initial reduction of 25 percent in first 
year: remaining reductions over five 
years. 
Product-specific AMS  Base level is average of 1995–2000  Base period levels not to be exceeded
b 
De minimis  Base level is 5% of value of production 
for non-product-specific support and 
5% of the value of production of 
products that receive product-specific 
support 
Reduction of [50] [60] percent [from the 
start of the implementation period] [in 
five equal steps]. 
Blue box    Capped at 2.5% of value of production 
in base period (1995–2000) applied from 
start of implementation period. 
Product-specific blue box    Product-specific caps at average value in 
1995–2000 period
c. 
Cotton AMS     Reduced by 74.29% in two years, with a 
25% reduction in the first year 
Source: Author’s summary based on WTO (2008)  
a Blue Box payments exceeded 5 percent of value of production in base period. 
b Qualifications apply where product-specific AMS amounts above de minimis levels have been introduced since the base period 
(para 21) and where the product-specific AMS was below the de minimis level during each year of the base period (para 25). In 
the former case, the two most recent (notified) AMS levels may be taken as the base: In the latter case, the de minimis level may 
be used. 
c Qualifications apply when blue box support was not provided for the whole of the base period (para 41) and where there is a 
corresponding one-for-one reduction in the AMS for a product (para 43). In the first case the E.U. can use the average of three 
years blue box payments, and for the second case the “transferred” support may exceed the blue box limit for that product. 
                                                       
25 In order to examine the impact of these changes on future notifications, we assume that new WTO support commitments 
are implemented over the period from 2010–2014, so that all new reductions and bindings apply fully in 2014.    19 
Table 10. OTDS, Total AMS, de minimis, and total blue box commitments for the E.U. under WTO 
Doha Round Revised Draft Modalities (in million euros) 
   
URAA final bound total AMS  67,160.0 
Value of production  222,576.5 
10% value of production (1995–2000)  22,257.7 
5% value of production (1995–2000)  11,128.8 
Blue box (in excess of 5% value of production) 
a      20,887.9  
Base OTDS    110,305.6  
   
OTDS (85% reduction)   16,545.8 
OTDS (75% reduction)   27,576.4 
   
Final Bound Total AMS (70% reduction)   20,148.00 
AMS/production 1995–2000 
b  21.5% 
   
Total blue box   
2.5% value of production (1995–2000)  5,564.41 
Average blue box relative to base OTDS 
c  19% 
   
Cotton   
Base AMS for cotton (million euro)  752.7 
Cotton AMS reduction (assuming 70% total AMS reduction) 
d  74.29 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WTO (2008) 
a Tests for paragraph 1 condition; picks up blue box when above 5% of production value 
b Tests for application of paragraph 15, less than 40%, additional effort does not apply 
c Tests for paragraph 39: less than 40%, so no phased reduction allowed 
d Application of cotton reduction formula paragraph 55 for AMS    20 
Table 11. Phased reduction of OTDS and AMS, and de minimis limits, E.U., under Revised Draft 
Modalities 
  Immediate   Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
Reductions             
Proportions of the base OTDS to be cut             
OTDS (85% reduction)
a  0.33  0.43  0.54  0.64  0.75  0.85 
OTDS (75% reduction)
a  0.33  0.41  0.50  0.58  0.67  0.75 
AMS (25% initial; 70% total reduction)
b  0.25  0.34  0.43  0.52  0.61  0.70 
Cotton AMS (25% initial, 74.29% total)
c  0.25  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.74 
             
Scheduled limits (in million euros)             
OTDS (85% reduction)  73,904.7  62,432.9  50,961.2  39,489.4  28,017.6  16,545.8 
OTDS (75% reduction)  73,904.7  64,639.1  55,373.4  46,107.7  36,842.1  27,576.4 
AMS (25% initial; 70% total reduction)  50,370.0  44,325.6  38,281.2  32,236.8  26,192.4  20,148.0 
Cotton AMS (25% initial; 74.29% total)
d  564.6  193.6  193.6       
             
De minimis             
50% immediate reduction de minimis  2.5%           
60% immediate reduction de minimis  2.0%           
50% phased (5-year) reduction de minimis    4.5%  4.0%  3.5%  3.0%  2.5% 
60% phased (5-year) reduction de minimis    4.4%  3.8%  3.2%  2.6%  2.0% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WTO (2008) 
a Initial reduction of one-third, with remainder phased-in in five equal steps (paragraph 5) 
b Initial reduction of 25%, with remainder phased-in in five equal steps (paragraph 15) 
c Two-year phase-in period for cotton, 
with higher total reduction percentage 
d Implementation period for cotton specified as one-third of the general period. 
In order to examine the impact of these changes on future notifications, we assume that new 
WTO support commitments are implemented over the period 2009–2013, so that all new reductions and 
bindings apply fully by the notification year 2013/14. Our assumptions about the evolution of agricultural 
policy in the E.U. apply as above, implying that progressively more of the direct payments can be notified 
as green box. 
The Falconer paper contains a range of reductions in the bindings on the OTDS and cuts in de 
minimis allowances, as shown in Table 9. Under the larger (more ambitious) cuts for the OTDS, the 
ceilings for the E.U. fall rapidly over the implementation period of 2009–2013. The anticipated actual 
OTDS for the EU27 in 2013/14 is 27.1 billion euros, well above the more ambitious OTDS ceiling of 
16.5 billion euros. Under the more modest reductions in the agreed bindings on the OTDS in the proposed 
Falconer modalities and the smaller reduction in the de minimis percentages, the OTDS ceiling (27.6 
billion euros) is less binding on the actual OTDS in the E.U. over the implementation period. The E.U. 
current total AMS is projected to stay within the AMS commitment until the year 2012/13 but exceed the 
ceiling of 20.1 billion euros by around 4.0 billion euros in 2013/14. By contrast, the blue box limits would 
be well above the anticipated notification in this category. 
In addition to the constraints on total AMS and blue box support, the revised modalities draft also 
proposes restrictions on product-specific AMS and blue box amounts. These constraints might well be 
binding in specific instances. The revised draft suggests caps on product-specific AMS payments at the 
1995–2000 levels.
26
                                                       
26 Some flexibility is included in those cases where the AMS for a product has recently been higher than in the base period.  
 Increases in administered prices are effectively restricted by this constraint. Changes 
in fixed reference prices were not envisaged in the URAA (and apparently not under discussion in the 
Doha Round) and would presumably have to be negotiated. But variations in the level of “eligible   21 
production” for both the products where the market price support is calculated and for those where an 
equivalent measure of support is used could well lead to AMS limits being violated.  
Blue box limits at a product-specific level are also likely to have some impact. Though the total 
blue box spending may be decreasing as payments move to the green box, those for individual products 
cannot increase to make use of that “slack.” Although these payments are currently tied to fixed yield, 
areas, and head of livestock, the restriction implies no possibility of any rebasing of such payments that 
would violate the limits. 
Figure 3. Projected notifications of domestic support, E.U., 2007/08 to 2013/14 and proposed limits 









These results should not be interpreted as an indication that the WTO constraints introduced by 
the Doha Round will not affect E.U. policy. In order to stay within the new limits, changes would have to 
be made to ensure that direct payments can continue to be notified as green box without being challenged 
by other countries. However, unlike the situation in the United States, relatively little of the support 



























OTDS limit  22 
10.  ALTERNATIVE SUBSIDY NOTIFICATIONS 
So far the discussion has assumed that there is no ambiguity with respect to the allocation of the elements 
of domestic support into the categories (boxes) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Such ambiguity does 
exist, and can be potentially important in the context of domestic and trade policy. By estimating 
“alternative” notifications, it is possible to see the range of ambiguity that exists and hence the scope for 
circumvention of WTO constraints by governments in the act of notification. Such alternative 
notifications could be useful to illustrate the result of WTO panel recommendations or the outcome of 
negotiations. 
The main issue that has been raised with respect to the CAP and the WTO notifications has 
revolved around the direct payments, and more specifically the incorporation of these into a single farm 
payment. The payments per hectare that were introduced in the MacSharry reforms were notified as blue 
box because they were limited to historic hectarage eligibilities and based on regional yields. In addition, 
they were not linked to prices. But the SPS introduced in the Fischler reforms of 2003 was in part 
intended to move subsidies into the green box, to avoid the constraints imposed on blue box (by its 
definition) and the AMS (by the constrained expenditures). So the question arises whether the placement 
of the SPS expenditure in the green box is likely to be controversial.  
Several commentators have addressed this issue. Swinbank (2007) and Swinbank and Tranter 
(2005) raise questions about the extent to which the payments under the SPS are compatible with the 
green box. They point out that the proposed reforms to the fruit and vegetables regime, making land on 
which fruit and vegetables are grown eligible for SPS payments, are clearly designed to overcome the 
problem the United States encountered over upland cotton. But as payments are still made to farmers, 
annually, on the basis of the land at their disposal, and cross compliance applies, the authors raise the 
question of whether the scheme does fully meet the criteria of paragraph 6 of the green box.
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Table 12. Impact of different notification assumptions for direct payments (DPs), E.U. notifications, 
2007/08 and 2013/14 (billion euros)  
 McMahon 
(2007) points out that the E.U. updated the base for direct payments when the SPS was introduced (from 
1989–1991 to 2000–2002), thus making it possible to argue that farmers might anticipate such updating in 
the future.  
Table 12 shows the range of possible notifications under different decisions with respect to the 
appropriate categorization of direct payments. If all direct payments were to be placed in the green box, 
that box would grow from 55.2 billion euros in 2007 to 57.9 billion euros in 2013. If all such payments 
were to be notified as blue box, that box would reach 34 billion euros by 2013. If the direct payments 
were to be considered as neither green nor blue box compatible (an unlikely event), then the AMS would 
be notified as between 46.1 billion and 49.2 billion euros, depending on the division between product-
specific and non-product-specific AMS categories. 
  Notification for 2007/08  Notification for 2013/14 
Notification category of DPs  AMS  Blue Box  Green Box  AMS  Blue Box  Green Box 
Green box  18.1  0.2  55.2  16.4  0.2  57.9 
Blue box  18.1  31.3  22.1  16.4  34.0  22.1 
PS/AMS
a  39.0  0.2  22.1  46.1  0.2  22.1 
NPS/AMS
b  48.2  0.2  22.1  49.2  0.2  22.1 
Split notification  18.1  7.3  46.7  16.4  3.2  54.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
a Product-specific AMS 
b Non-product-specific AMS 
                                                       
27 Moreover, they suggest that the E.U.’s contention that the SPS is a decoupled payment would not be enhanced in any 
DSB case by recent statements from senior members of the E.U.’s policy community suggesting they do affect production (See, 
for example, Agra Europe’s report on the European Parliament’s opposition to a 20 percent voluntary rate of modulation, because 
of fear of distortion of competition between the member states; March 9, 2007: EP/1-2).   23 
Under current WTO constraints, the impact of different notification assumptions is not great. The 
limit of 67.2 billion euros for the AMS is not approached, and neither blue nor green boxes are limited.
28
                                                       
28 Inclusion in the blue box of new or modified subsidies, however, could be challenged, but these subsidies could be 
transferred to the AMS without violating the AMS limit.  
 
However, the situation would be drastically changed if the Doha Round were to be completed. In all cases 
except where the direct payments are notified in the green box (where no limit exists), the WTO 
constraints would be violated by the year 2013. If direct payments are notified in the blue box, the total 
would far exceed the limit of 6.1 billion euros suggested in the Falconer draft. Up to 28 billion euros 
would have to be notified in the AMS, and this would well exceed the limit of 20.1 billion euros 
suggested in the same draft. A fortiori, if all the direct payments were to be notified in the AMS, the limit 
of 20.1 billion euros would again be violated. Perhaps more relevant is the effect on the OTDS of any 
decision to place direct payments outside the green box. The OTDS limit of 16.5 billion euros suggested 
by Falconer’s more ambitious cuts would be equal to the level of direct payments alone, leaving all other 
support to be cut or changed to green box compatible payments.    24 
11.  INTERPRETING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT 
NOTIFICATIONS 
The level of domestic support is only one aspect of the degree to which E.U. agriculture is accorded 
favorable treatment. Tariffs on agricultural products are generally higher than for nonagricultural goods, 
and often higher than for many other developed countries for the same agricultural products. In addition, 
export subsidies help to keep up prices of products surplus to domestic requirements. As mentioned 
above, domestic support (particularly through direct payments) has therefore become more important as 
tariff levels have declined and export subsidies have been cut back. But to see the implication of this shift, 
we need to consider the significance of the particular measure of support that is notified to the WTO and 
compare this with other measures that can and have been used to monitor support and assistance to the 
farm sector. 
Support to the farm sector, broadly speaking, is composed of direct payments (funded by the 
taxpayer) and what is usually termed market price support. The latter is derived from import protection, 
intervention buying, and export subsidies. Depending on their characteristics, direct payments will be 
included in the AMS or in the blue or green boxes. The AMS is the sum of nonexempt direct payments 
(i.e., those that do not qualify for either the blue or green boxes) and a computed market price support 
“calculated using the gap between a fixed external reference price and the applied administered price.” 
The market support component of the AMS is therefore an incomplete proxy for the impact of policy. 
Thus, for milk, the E.U. has only ever declared an AMS based on butter and skim milk powder 
production, rather than on overall E.U. milk production, presumably because these were the only dairy 
products for which intervention prices were set. The benefit of the support of dairy products does, of 
course, find its way back to dairy farmers in the price that they receive for milk. 
Not only is the AMS an incomplete measure of support, the method of calculating the AMS can 
lead to paradoxical results. It was mentioned above that an increase in world market prices does not lead 
to a reduced AMS, because of the use of a “fixed external price,” but there can be circumstances in which 
high prices result in an increase in the AMS. For example, the recently buoyant prices for butter and skim 
milk powder, pushing above E.U. support prices, have probably encouraged switching of raw milk 
supplies into these utilizations. This will have increased the E.U.’s current AMS on these products by 
increasing the eligible quantity.  
In addition, the AMS can overstate the impact of policy change. This can arise as a result of 
changes in the design of policy. The abolition of an “applied administered price,” even though import 
protection is still in place, can remove the product from the AMS calculation. Thus in the shadow 
notifications below, we have assumed that the E.U.’s 2003 decision to remove intervention for rye will 
result in an elimination of the notified AMS for rye, and we expect a similar result for the subsequent 
decision to eliminate intervention for maize.   25 
12.  OTHER SUPPORT ESTIMATES  
The level of support afforded to E.U. agriculture through the CAP has been the focus of a number of 
studies over the years. The OECD has been monitoring the agricultural policies of its membership since 
1987 and has been reporting annually the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE), more recently relabeled as 
the producer support estimate. The PSE differs in important ways from the WTO domestic support 
categories. First, the PSE is more inclusive, accounting for support given through border measures. The 
market support component of the AMS overlaps with the market price support element of the PSE, but 
only because administered prices are typically supported by border measures. Second, the PSE uses 
current price comparisons to arrive at the market price support: the market support part of the AMS (and 
the EMS) is measured against fixed reference prices. This causes the PSE to respond to world market 
conditions in a way not observed in the AMS. Third, the measures differ in coverage: The WTO 
notification covers in principle all agricultural goods, whereas the PSE is calculated on the basis of the 
most significant products and then aggregated up on the assumption that excluded products are afforded 
the same protection. 
A recent study by the World Bank has estimated some measures of distortion in agricultural 
policies over the past five decades for a large number of countries. The developed countries of Western 
Europe were included in this study (Josling, 2007). The distortion measures included the nominal rate of 
assistance (comparing actual production values to those that would have been in the absence of specific 
agricultural policies) and relative rates of assistance, comparing distortions in agriculture with those in the 
rest of the economy. The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) is the closest to the PSE and the AMS 
measures. Because much of the data since 1987 that was used in the World Bank study was based on the 
database compiled by the OECD, it is not surprising that the PSE and the NRA are strongly correlated. 
They differ mainly in product coverage (and the assumptions about noncovered commodities) and in the 
assumptions about the amount of distortion caused by direct payments.  
Figure 4 shows the comparison of the three measures just described. The fact that the level of 
domestic support as notified to the WTO does not follow the same fluctuations as the PSE and the World 
Bank’s NRA estimate emphasizes the significance of the use of fixed reference prices in establishing the 
market support component of the AMS. As significant is the fact that the WTO domestic support measure 
as notified shows a decline that is not apparent in the PSE and the NRA. The reason is that the former 
largely reflects the way that domestic support is calculated in the WTO notifications. The E.U. domestic 
support notifications are reduced over time as the AMS (based on an outdated comparison of domestic 
and world prices) declines. The direct payments, whether partially or fully decoupled, increase but not to 
the same extent. Indeed, cuts in administered prices can reduce the AMS even if there is no decline in 
domestic price levels (and hence no switch to direct payments). The PSE and NRA stay high because they 
reflect the protection given by import tariffs and export subsidies, as well as the direct payments. If there 
is no substantial improvement in market access or reduction in export subsidies, domestic prices can still 
stay well above world prices, even if the AMS declines.
29
                                                       
29 One illustration of this difference is in the case of milk. The dairy component of milk support in the AMS includes 
subsidies implicit in the support of butter and skim milk prices. Apart from the compensation payments for the 2003 reduction of 
the support prices, no further milk support is included. But the PSE and NRA include large implicit transfers through the higher 
price of milk that is the (intended) result of price support in the milk products markets.  
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APPENDIX A: POLICY CHANGES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
AMBER/BLUE/GREEN BOX CLASSIFICATIONS 
This appendix gives more detail on the allocation among the “boxes” of the E.U.’s domestic support for 
CAP commodity programs. An attempt is made to incorporate recent policy changes and to anticipate the 
implementation of these changes insofar as they might affect future E.U. domestic support notifications.  
The table is organized by commodity and includes all the main products that have undergone 
reform in the past five years. The second column shows the amount indicated for product-specific 
domestic support by the E.U. in its latest notification, for 2003/04. The third column indicates in brief the 
policy changes that have taken place since 2003, in particular those associated with the Fischler reforms.
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Table A.1. Details of CAP reforms and implications for notification of domestic support 
 
The final column indicates the allocation to the URAA boxes of the amounts of subsidies that have been 
agreed. Some ambiguity will exist so long as the policies are administered differently in different member 
states (see text).   
Product  2003/04 Domestic Support 
in G/AG/N/EEC/53 




Old area payments; declared as 
blue box 
Fischler reforms of 2003 created the SPS (to be 
introduced in 2005 or 2006 depending on the 
member state), but some coupled payments remain 
(including supplemental payments for durum 
wheat), and partial decoupling was allowed. 
Switch from blue to green 
box, starting 2005 (i.e., 
from 2005/06 declaration)  
Rye  Product specific AMS of 
€243.2 million 
Fischler 2003 reforms abolished intervention, 
effective in the 2004/05 marketing year 
Corresponding reduction in 
the AMS following 
abolition of the applied 
administered price  
Maize  Product specific AMS of €391 
million 
June 2007 agreement is to phase out intervention 
for maize over three years period beginning in 
2007/2008. Limit of 1.5 million metric tons in 
2007/08, falling to 700,000 metric tons in 2008/09, 
and then to zero in 2009/10. 
See row above on rye. 
AMS unchanged through 
2008/09, then zero. 
Rice  Product specific AMS of 
€420.7 million (price gap of 
€298.35-143.3 per metric ton 
million); and blue box 
payments of €110.1 million 
Fischler 2003 halved intervention price from 
2004/05 marketing year (so AMS price gap 
becomes €150–143.3 per metric ton) and allows 
increase in area payments, which are partly bundled 
into the decoupled SPS, but also include a product-
specific payment (supplement). 
Sharp reduction in the AMS 
for 2004/05 
Initially a sharp increase in 
blue box payments (in the 
2004/05 declaration), but 
thereafter mostly switched 
to the green box (SPS) 
Dairy   Product specific AMS for 
butter (€5,011.8 million) and 
skim milk powder (SMP) 
(€1,602.1 million), but nothing 
for cheese or fresh products 
For milk, national aid of 
€230.8 million, but de minimis 
Agenda 2000 agreed a staged 15% cut in the 
intervention price of butter and SMP from 2005. 
Fischler 2003 brought this forward by one year and 
increased butter cut to -25%. 
Introduction of a dairy premium, which the E.U. 
declared as blue box (G/AG/N/EEC/17). Paid as 
such in 2004, but included in SPS thereafter (some 
member states did so from 2005, others from 2006 
or 2007). 
Staged reduction in butter 
and SMP AMS from 
2004/05 
 
Blue box dairy premium in 
2004/05; thereafter phased 
switch to green box (SPS), 
with blue payments falling 
to zero in 2007/08. 
 
                                                       
30 For the Fischler 2004 reform, see Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 864/2004 of April 29, 2004, amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and 
establishing certain support schemes for farmers, and adapting it by reason of the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia to the European Union (OJ L 161, 30.4.2004) in 
Official Journal L 206 , 09/06/2004: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R0864R(01):EN:HTML   28 
Table A.1. Continued 
Product  2003/04 Domestic 
Support 
in G/AG/N/EEC/53 
Policy Change  Implications 
Nuts  No support notified 
for 2003/04 
Fischler 2003 creates new aid scheme beginning January 2004. 
€120.75/ha on 0.8k ha (presumably since expanded for 
EU25/27) 
Also, national aid on same land, maximum of another 
€120.75/ha 
From 2004/05 blue box 
payments:  
E.U. aid only, maximum of 
€96.6 million for EU15,  
Rises to €193.2 million for 
EU15 if national aid paid as 
well 
Energy crops  —  Fischler 2003 results in new aid scheme from January 2004. 
€45/ha on 1.5 million ha (raised to 2 million from 2007 to allow 
for new member states) 
Area overrun in 2007, and aid paid on only 0.7 of area claimed 
Likely to be abolished in the “Health Check” 
Only 0.31 million hectares 
claimed in 2004: therefore 
blue box payments of 
€13.95 million in 2004/05 
Thereafter maximum €67/5 
million for 2005/06 and 
2006/07 
€90 million for 2007/08 and 
2008/09 
Zero thereafter 
Cotton  Product specific 
EMS of €769.4 
million 
Fischler 2004 reform, applicable from Jan. 1, 2006. 
35% as a direct (blue box) area aid and 65% in the SPS 
National base area for Greece, 370,000 ha; Spain, 70,000 ha; 
Portugal, 360 ha 
Amount of the aid per eligible hectare: Greece, EUR 594 for 
300,000 ha and €342.85 for the remaining 70,000 ha; Spain, 
€1,039; Portugal, €556 
Although challenged in the European Court, the policy remains 
in force. 
Switch from amber to 
blue/green for 2006/07: 
Blue box: €275 million 
Green box: €511 million 
Sugar  AMS of  €5,601.9 






metric tons; less 
producer levy of 
€277.8 million and 
€8.1 million direct 
aid in Italy 
December 2005 agreement. 
(i) a staged 36% cut in support price (now known as a reference 
price). Net of restructuring charge: 
2006/07, €505.5 per metric ton 
2007/08, €458.1 per metric ton 
2008/09, €428.2 per metric ton 
2009/10, €404.4 per metric ton 
(ii) a quota buy-out (and restructuring package), but this hasn’t 
yet removed enough production, and so in 2006/07 the E.U. 
Commission canceled 2.5 million metric tons of quota 
iii) SPS: €907 million in 2006/07; and €1,542 million in 2007/08 
Staged reduction in AMS 
(from 2006/07) as a result of 
(i) 36% cut and (ii) smaller 
production 
No blue box payments 
But increase in green box 
(AMS) from 2006/07 
Tobacco  AMS = nonexempt 
direct payments of 
€923.9 million 
Fischler 2004 reform: phased (four-year) transition from 2006. 
Aid based on 2000–2002 payments 
Full decoupling from 2010, but 50% of the funds will be for 
restructuring the tobacco sector 
During the transition at least 40% of the money must be in the 
SPS. 
Maximum amounts (million euros) of coupled aid by member 
state in 2006–09, including the amounts to be transferred to the 
Community Tobacco Fund: 
Belgium—€2.374 million 
Germany—€21.287 million  
Greece—€227.331 million  
Spain— €70.599 million  
France—€48.217 million  
Italy—€200.821 million  









Blue box—no more than 
€581.4 million 
Green box (SPS)—no less 
than €387.6 million   29 
Table A.1. Continued 
Product  2003/04 Domestic Support 
in G/AG/N/EEC/53 
Policy Change  Implications 
Bananas  Direct aid of €233.3 million  Agreed December 2006: “The compensatory aid scheme 
for banana growers, which has been into force since 1993 
will be abolished as of 2007 and an additional envelope of 
€278.8 million will add to the money allocated to the 
POSEI program, which supports agricultural production in 
the outermost regions of the E.U. For bananas produced in 
regions other than the outermost regions, an additional 
amount of €4.5 million overall will be transferred to the 
Single Payment Scheme that applies to agricultural 
products covered by previous reforms. The new rules will 
apply from 1 January 2007.” 
2007: Abolish AMS 
No blue box 




AMS for products subject to 
the minimum import price 
regime: €8,061 million 
Plus withdrawals: 
cauliflower €2.8 million (but 
de minimis), aubergines €0.1 
million and “others” €1.5 
million 
From Jan. 1, 2007, land eligible for SPS payments. 
“Member States may if they so choose postpone the 
distribution of fruit and vegetable entitlements for up three 
years.” 
No change (but a Doha 






Citrus: €193.1 million 
Lemons: €45.5 million 
Peaches: €11.9 million 
Plums: €34.6 million* 
Pears: €15.9 million 
Figs: €6.0 million* 
Tomatoes: €315.9 million 
Grapes: €114.6 
Calculated as production 
aids or *price support  
Agreed June 2007: “All existing support for processed fruit 
and vegetables will be decoupled and the national 
budgetary ceilings for the SPS will be increased. The total 
amount that will be transferred to the SPS is around €800 
million. For tomatoes, member states will be allowed to 
apply transitional payments for a four-year transitional 
period (2008–2011), provided that the coupled proportion 
of the payment does not exceed 50 percent of the national 
ceiling. For non-annual crops, they will be allowed to 
apply transitional payments for five years, provided that 
after 31 December 2010, the coupled proportion does not 
exceed 75 percent of the national ceiling.” 
Eliminates AMS from 
2007 
€800 million split 
between blue and green 
(SPS) boxes 
Hops  Area aid: €12.5 million  Fischler 2004, from January 2005. SPS, but can keep 25% 
coupled (Germany, France, Austria, Slovenia) 
AMS zero 
Max blue box = €3 
million 
Wine  AMS of €637.8 million: 
Private storage aid, 
Distillation, Aids for specific 
uses 
 
Proposed July 2007: “All the inefficient market support 
measures—various aids for distillation, private storage aid, 
export refunds—would be abolished from day one. The 
addition of sugar to enrich wine—chaptalisation—would 
be banned, and aid for using must for enrichment, 
introduced to compensate for the higher cost compared to 
chaptalisation, would also be abolished. Crisis distillation 
would be replaced by two crisis management measures, 
paid for from national financial envelopes. Much more 
money would go into promoting E.U. wine, particularly on 
third country markets.” 
“National financial envelopes:” The overall budget will 
vary from €634 million in 2009 to €850 million from 2015. 
The amount available for each country will be calculated 
according to vine area, production and historical 
expenditure. Possible measures include “promotion in third 
countries, vineyard restructuring/conversion, support for 
green harvest, new crisis management measures, i.e. 
insurance against natural disasters and the administrative 
costs of setting-up a sector-specific mutual fund.” 
“All areas under vines will be eligible for entitlements for 
the Single Farm Payment,” but apparently with no increase 
in budget. 
If adopted, abolition of 
wine AMS (from 2008 
or 2009), and increase 
in green box spending 
(but not SPS). 30 
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATING THE BLUE AND GREEN BOX PAYMENTS,  
2004/05–2006/07, FROM BUDGET DATA 
This appendix explains the method used to estimate the amounts that will be notified for the three 
marketing years subsequent to the last official notification. The estimates for the major commodities are 
based on budget data that is currently available and forward provisions for spending. Exact budget 
expenditure can deviate from budgeted amounts, but the difference is unlikely to be significant.  
E.U. Budget and WTO Notifications 
The E.U.’s budget year nominally relates to a calendar year, but actually covers expenditures incurred 
from October 16 of the previous year to October 15 of the year in question. Consequently, the old arable 
area payments of crop year x were paid in budget year x + 1, and this has been carried forward into the 
new Single Payment Scheme (SPS). Blue box and other domestic support commitments are, however, 
reported to the WTO on a marketing-year basis. Accordingly, the first payments under the SPS, relating 
to 2005, were paid in budget year 2006, and will be reported in the E.U.’s green box declaration for 
2005/06. Similarly, for the new member states who joined the E.U. in 2004, Single Area Payment Scheme 
(SAPS) (for eight entrants) and Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) payments (for two 
entrants) were first paid in budget year 2005, but will appear in the E.U.’s green and blue box declarations 
for 2004/05. 
Accordingly, the E.U.’s blue box declaration for 2003/04, taken directly from the E.U.’s WTO 
submission in G/AG/N/EEC/53, can be linked with the items in the E.U.’s 2004 budget outrun.
31
However, the blue and green box spending amounts for EU27 as calculated from budget data do 
not correspond exactly to those in Table 4, above. In particular, the budget data give a significantly larger 
number for the green box payments. Relying on the E.U. Commission’s partition of expenditure between 
the SPS and other direct aids, and allowing for a probable overestimate of the extent to which the new 
member states will top up the SAPS, might lead to an overestimate of the size of the green box when 
  Most of 
the arable payments are grouped together as a single item in the budget document, so one cannot exactly 
replicate the WTO submission. However, the livestock payments identified in the 2004 budget outrun 
match exactly the WTO declaration for 2003/04. The close correspondence between the notified subsidy 
amounts and the budget numbers allows one to create the likely notifications for 2004/05, 2005/06, 
2006/07, and 2007/08. (In the text, these years are referred to as 2004–2007).  We have used the 
Preliminary Draft Budget for 2008 and earlier documents to create the E.U.’s possible blue box, and its 
“new” green box submissions. The Preliminary Draft Budget differentiates between “decoupled direct 
aids” (SPS and SAPS) and “other direct aids,” which we have assumed will be treated by the E.U. as blue 
box payments. 
For the 2005 budget (i.e., the 2004/05 declaration), we have included the dairy premium, nuts, 
energy crops, and “other” (discontinued schemes) in the blue box, and assumed the other payments 
remain in the AMS (but switch to the blue box in subsequent years). The 2005 budget also sees the first 
payments in the new member states of SAPS. Under SAPS, in 2004 the E.U. paid 25 percent of the full 
E.U. rate; and the new member states could top up to 55 percent. Assuming they all did so, the E.U. 
amount spent  has to be multiplied by a coefficient of 2.2 in 2004/05 (55/25) to get the full green box 
spending.  
In the old member states, the SPS does not appear in the budget until 2006. However, where 
partial decoupling applies, the “coupled” portion of the payment is retained in the blue box. Thus in 
2006/07 some 84 percent of direct aid would be decoupled (excluding allowance for the modulated funds 
which have gone elsewhere in the green box). 
                                                       
31 Final adoption of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2006, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 78, March 15, 2006, recording the outrun for 2004, available in online files at 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/publications/budget_en.htm. 31 
using budget data alone. “Modulation,” in effect a tax on all direct payments, with the funds diverted to 
the Second Pillar of the CAP (rural development), will also reduce blue box and increase green box 
spending, though this is not included in the Commission’s data. On the other hand, the switch from AMS 
to blue box compensatory payments may come later than suggested in the estimates reported in this paper 
if there are any undue delays in the implementation of the policy shift.  
The National Ceilings 
An alternative (or complementary) way of estimating the allocation of funds between green and blue 
boxes is to examine the “national ceilings” (sometimes called envelopes) that limit the spending on SPS 
and other subsidies and the way those funds are used. Each member state’s package of payments is 
limited to the national ceiling (Appendix II of the basic regulation 1782/2003), and this has been updated 
periodically to include the new reforms. However, the way in which the direct payments are made is the 
responsibility of each member state (subject to agreed constraints), as discussed in the text. The 
Commission has published an overview of how the member states plan to implement the SPS (see the pdf 
file dated May 2007, “Implementation of the CAP reform in the Member States” at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/sfp/index_en.htm#capinfosheets). This gives the date of 
implementation (e.g., 2005 or 2006), the date the dairy premium is to be included in the SPS, the extent of 
decoupling, and so forth. 
However, in the present context, tracking national expenditure would be time-consuming for the 
E.U. of 27 members, and the notification to the WTO is in any case the responsibility of the E.U. 
Commission. So the construction of the notifications on the basis of national data is not attempted here.  32 
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